With a challenging Autumn Budget approaching, Keir Starmer and his ministers need urgently to refine the Government’s case for increased defence spending. Despite the ambitious targets set earlier this year, there is little public discussion about the strategic rationale for the extra investment or the domestic trade-off it will require.
Defence was a marginal issue during recent party conference season. This was striking given the scale of the planned extra investment. It may have been because of the sense that there is largely a policy consensus; most Westminster parties support boosting the defence budget. Yet none are preparing the public for the additional financial burden on already stretched public finances this will bring. With Budget debate about tax rises and spending constraints underway, now is the time to be making the case.
Earlier this year, Keir Starmer committed his government to increasing annual defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027, with a further ambition of reaching 3% by the next general election. Overall, the long-term target is to hit 5% by 2035, in line with other NATO members. Details of how these targets are to be achieved were set out in the Strategic Defence Review and Defence Industrial Strategy documents published earlier this year.
While greater investment in defence may be seen as long overdue by those of us in the defence and security bubble, the real challenge will be bringing the British public on side. Too many voters believe that the Prime Minister promised to hike defence spending in response to pressure from US President Donald Trump rather than because of genuine security requirements. If the Government is going to adopt the “wartime pace” promised in the Defence Industrial Strategy, then convincing voters of the urgency of this mission needs to be given greater priority.
Starmer has tried to make the case to a wary public that increased defence spending will boost the economy. In his Labour conference speech, the Prime Minister spoke of defence investment as “undeniably good for growth, vital for national security”. In the two strategy documents, the argument is set out that the country will benefit from a “defence dividend” in terms of new jobs, increased investment and economic growth.
Despite the Government’s efforts, it is not clear that the message is sinking in, especially given the difficult economic climate. Indeed, most polls show that while at least half of voters surveyed are in favour of increased defence spending, support drops considerably when they are asked if this investment should come at the expense of other domestic priorities such as health, education, and welfare.
It may be that the PM and his Cabinet also need to shift to a wartime pace in selling this momentous policy change, focusing not just on economic growth but also fully explaining the threats the UK faces today. A dual-track approach could start with an elaboration of the threat environment, especially the real and visible threat posed by Russia and the diverse challenges coming from an increasingly assertive China. These explanations need to be placed against the backdrop of the new uncertainty about the American commitment to the defence of its NATO allies. There is also a role for the Opposition parties on this to make the case to their supporters free from partisan rancour.
Since the invasion of Ukraine three years ago, Russia has significantly increased its ‘grey zone’ activity, the use of aggressive tactics that fall short of outright conflict. Towards the UK and across Europe, this includes cyber attacks, disruptive drone activity, cutting vital undersea cables, interference and jamming of airplane navigation systems, arson, botched and successful assassinations, the weaponisation of migration, disinformation and election interference, the shadowing by Russian warships of NATO vessels in the Baltic, North, and Black Seas, attempts to put incendiary devices on cargo planes, and more. These tactics and activities are much more than irritants, they come with significant economic, security and societal costs. They are specifically designed to undermine our democracies and convince us that that our governments cannot deliver.
The threat is real, it is morphing, and it is emanating not just from Russia, but from other like-minded states. We are not doing enough to engage in a public discourse about the costs of these activities, and what can be done to prepare, respond, and build our own resilience against them. Better understanding is needed to solidify public support for greater defence spending.
The second track in making the case, focusing on the opportunities from a defence dividend, has been attempted to a degree, but does not yet appear to be persuading the public. Investments in education, research, science and technology, and creating a more conducive innovation climate will all positively impact society, far from the defence spheres. We need a more informed and data-driven public awareness campaign. We also need many more real-life examples of how this works in practice. The government have announced five Defence Growth Deals across the UK and there was an effort to localise the jobs impact from the recent trade delegation to India.
Short of a direct attack on the UK homeland, the threat perception is unlikely to equal that of countries much closer to Russia and Ukraine, where governments enjoy much wider public support for defence spending. Latvia has reintroduced compulsory conscription while Denmark has expanded conscription to women, with little public opposition
Last January, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said that his country was neither at war nor at peace. Last month, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed this sentiment by saying Europe was neither at war nor at peace with Russia. The UK needs to be equally vocal in making the case not just to persuade the UK public, but to involve them in this effort too.
Karin von Hippel is Chair of the Defence and Security Practice at Arden Strategies.
